On May 5, the newly delivered T-59 modified tanks (T-59G) to Bangladesh were tested in Chattogram for target shooting, resulting in casualties.

On May 8, we obtained a top classified document, “Briefing on the serious accident of Bangladesh T-59G tank during target shooting in the army,” from the CCP’s Central Military Commission. The Chinese team decided to blame Pakistan-made ammunition for the accident and cover up the fatal flaws of Chinese T-59G tanks. Meanwhile, the Chinese and Bangladeshi militaries strictly blocked the news, which is the result of the CCP’s large-scale corruption of the military of the Belt and Road countries.

Here is the content of the original Chinese document translated by me. The Chinese content is released via Lude Media on May 8 (https://x.com/lude_media/status/1788385448446079429).

Listen to Dr. Yan’s podcast: CCP’s secret report of the serious accident caused by T59G tank in Bangladesh

To note, the content within ( ) is written in the original document, while the content within [ ] is noted by me.

On May 5, 2024, our expert team for Bangladesh T-59G tanks received a notice from the Bangladesh 902 workshop that during the tank shooting process, a personnel accident occurred in the Seventh Regiment of Bangladesh using the T-59G tanks delivered by us. The commander of one of the tanks and a gunner suffered burns, and one loader died.

Our expert team immediately reported to the relevant departments. On May 6, after receiving a notice from Bangladesh, the expert team and CCP’s Central Military Commission representative office, together with personnel from the Bangladesh Armor Bureau, took the flight to go to the Chittagong accident site.

I. On May 7, the Chinese on-site accident investigation team learned and reported the following situation:

1. The accident vehicle number is 260198. The vehicle is one of the fourth batch of vehicles recently delivered to Bangladesh (the fourth batch was delivered from March to April 2024, with a total of 30 tanks delivered to the foreign customer. The vehicles were successively delivered to the troops for use in full compliance with the acceptance technical requirements. One of the users, the 7th Bangladesh Regiment, followed the original plan and immediately went to Chittagong for target practice after picking up four newly delivered tanks in early May). The vehicle fired a total of 60 rounds of ammunition before the accident.

1.1 Among them, 30 rounds of ammunition were fired during the tank acceptance (22 rounds armor-piercing, 7 rounds grenade, and 1 round high-explosive anti-tank. All ammunition types were supplied by us and passed the target shooting test).

1.2 The remaining 30 rounds were fired from May 1 to 4, all of which were armor-piercing rounds. The accidental ammunition was the 31st armor-piercing round fired this time and the fifth round fired that day. All ammunition for this shooting was produced by POF of Pakistan. Production date in 2022.

2. The accident occurred at around 2:40 pm on May 4, and operations such as loading ammunition before shooting were normal. The shooting uses the simple working mode and is fired manually. After firing, the gunpowder retreated normally, but about 152mm of the retrieval process was not completed, the gun bolt was not opened, and the cartridge case remained in the gun bore. The ammunition was fired forward and fell about 700-800 meters (it failed to reach the target range).

3. According to the description of the soldiers on site, in order to observe the ammunition loading position, Bangladesh side did not install an aluminum alloy protective plate on the right side. In addition, the initial pressure and final pressure of the gun were not checked before shooting.

4. After the shooting, the commander was burned, the gunner was burned, and the right chin of his face was shattered by the bolt body baffle flying out, and the bolt body baffle was deformed; the loader died and was burned, and the left half of his head was shattered by the baffle plate flying out. The source of the force that caused the bolt body baffle and gear plate to fly out and injure people cannot be determined at the scene and requires analysis by relevant domestic experts in China.

5. The on-site working group observed the inside of the vehicle body and found basically no traces of fire damage to the interior of the tank.

6. Some of the 125 armor-piercing bullets used by Bangladesh on the vehicle were seen at the scene (Bangladesh purchased them from Pakistan, which is cheaper). Except for a few cases of external water accumulation (it just rained on the morning of May 7), the ammunition is in a dry state. Desiccant, ammunition packaging, etc., are in good condition.

II. Bangladeshi attitude: The Bangladeshi side held an on-site meeting today, led by G1 [codename given by CCP], the first secretary of the Director of the Armor Bureau, CO and some officers of the 7th Regiment, the Chinese working group and our military agents were present. At the meeting, G1 stated that the inside of the tank should be a safe space isolated from the gun barrel. It is difficult to accept the casualties inside such a tank, and hoped that China would answer three questions:

1. The cause of the accident
2. Whether accident-related protective measures exist on the vehicle and why they are ineffective
3. Why the re-advancement was not completed

In addition, the Bangladeshi side did not complain about the Norinco Company during the entire investigation process. They just felt that the protective design of the Chinese T-59G vehicles was somewhat weak and could not effectively prevent personal injury in a vicious incident.

III. Technical team work on-site in Bangladesh

As soon as the accident occurred, Norinco’s First Department of Military Affairs reported it to the relevant departments of the company in a timely manner, and communicated with domestic factories in China, including 447, 803 and other departments, as soon as possible. A Chinese working group was set up on site to conduct on-site investigation and recording. The situation is as follows:

1. The tank was checked internally and no fire was found. The tank’s three defense systems are not activated and the inside of the tank is clean.

2. Only photos can be seen of the injured personnel in the tanks. The fragments of the gear plate and bolt body that caused casualties were left at the scene and photographed. The Bangladeshi operator violated target practice requirements and failed to install the right artillery protective plate.

3. The tank bolt body is stuck and cannot be opened at present, and the state of the steel bottom for ammunition firing cannot be seen. (This fault phenomenon has happened when the Bangladesh side using the third batch of T-59G tanks provided by us in 2022 during daily target training in Chittagong in February this year. – During the tank shooting, 2 of the 6 tanks suffered from this type of failure. The bolt body became stuck after firing. The faulty tank could not be rectified in the field. The Bangladeshi side deliberately sent the faulty tank to the 902 workshop and asked Chinese experts to help solve the problem. Even though the team used special tooling and other technical measures, it was impossible to open the bolt body and take out the bottom of the bomb. Therefore, we sent a 447 [Factory] artillery disassembly expert to work in Bangladesh in mid-April, preparing to complete the disassembly of the turret and artillery in late May 2024. After the jamming failure occurred in March 2024, the Chinese expert team informed the 902 Factory that the cause of the failure was not the tank problem, but the jamming caused by the use of Pakistani ammunition, and there was a risk of future use. The Chinese side reminded Bangladesh of the ammunition issue. 902 Factory also reported to the Armored Bureau via phone simultaneously).

4. The on-site Chinese working group, with the cooperation of Bangladeshi personnel, used on-site iron wire testing, and basically found that the stuck steel bottom had holes underneath, and the iron wire could easily pass through. The steel bottom of the Pakistan artillery used has been penetrated and holes have appeared.

5. Ten sets of AP (armor-piercing ammunition) steel bases already used by the Bangladeshi side were sampled on site. The steel numbers were exactly the same and indistinguishable. China has asked Bangladesh to seal some of the unused ammunition together with the first three items and send it to the 902 factory, waiting for further instructions from China.

IV. Research results of domestic working groups and related manufacturers.

After one day of research, the Chinese domestic opinions on the three issues raised by Bangladesh are as follows:

1. Cause of the accident:

Domestic experts have initially judged that the damage caused by the accident must have come from the ammunition. And due to the problem of the ammunition, it also caused serious ablation and further damage to the inside of the artillery. The following method is planned:

1.1 Send the tank to the 902 Factory, and China and Bangladesh will jointly open the bolt. If the bolt cannot be opened, the gun must be disassembled and the stuck steel bottom must be removed. Then, without ammunition, check whether the bolt opening action is normal to determine whether the performance of the gunpowder is normal.

1.2 Observe the stuck steel bottom to determine the condition of the cartridge case, including cracks and deformation.(Based on the position of the jet airflow at the end of the run at the scene, it should be that there are cracks in the upper right and lower right sides of the steel bottom of the cartridge case.) To be specific, you need to open the bolt body and observe the condition of the steel bottom.

1.3 The penetration of the steel bottom is a serious ammunition accident. It is recommended that foreign parties immediately stop using this batch of ammunition.

2. Whether accident-related protective measures exist on the vehicle and why they are ineffective:

For safety reasons, the tank factory specially designed the artillery hazard protection plate, including a latch plate on the left side and a latch cover on the right side. However, the design of the anti-hazard plate cannot fully protect against serious ammunition accidents. The left protective plate has already played some role in protecting the commander and gunner in serious accidents. However, in order to observe the ammunition loading position, the loader removed the aluminum plate – bolt guard plate on the right side, which ultimately caused a vicious accident.

3. Why was the re-advancement not completed?

The problem of insufficient re-advancement. The mechanism action during artillery firing:

After the artillery enters the chamber and closes the latch, the primer is ignited. High pressure is generated in the chamber, and the high-temperature gas pushes the artillery forward. The recoil part moves backward, and when the recoil position is reached, the energy stored in the recuperator is used to push the recoil part forward. During the re-advance movement, the breech block is opened by a semi-automatic machine, the cartridge is drawn out, and the barrel is drawn out to hang the bolt body. According to the on-site measurement, the distance before re-advance is 152mm. After analysis, this position is the starting position of the latch, which is consistent with the normal working condition of the artillery. At the scene, the breech block was not opened, the cartridge case was left in the chamber, and the re-advancement was not in place. It is related to the resistance encountered by the re-advance latch. The resistance comes from the compression of the latch body and the running tail by the cartridge case.

V. Report on the domestic processing situation in Norinco Company

1. Norinco’s regional department, quality department, representative office, first department of military affairs, and related factories established an accident investigation team.

2. The Chinese on-site working team has coordinated with the Bangladeshi side to seal up the tanks, ammunition and other materials involved in the accident as necessary and send them to the 902 factory.

3. Chinese experts will arrange on-site Chinese personnel or domestic personnel to conduct technical appraisals related to the accidental artillery. At the same time, they will prepare the procedures for technical personnel from relevant ammunition factories and steel bottom factories to go labroad, and provide certain technical support to Bangladesh when necessary.

4. China recommends that Bangladesh suspend the use of this ammunition to prevent the next injury, and that Bangladesh should request the ammunition supplier POF to conduct on-site identification and processing of ammunition as soon as possible. Before issuing written opinions to foreign personnel in China, it is recommended that the representative office inform Bangladesh of the cause of the accident and domestic measures as soon as possible.

[From] Chinese State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, on May 7, 2024

Listen to Dr. Yan’s podcast: CCP’s secret report of the serious accident caused by T59G tank in Bangladesh